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We present a dynamic model where the accumulation of patents generates
an increasing number of claims on sequential innovation. We study the equi-
librium innovation activity under three regimes: patents, no-patents and
patent pools. Patent pools increase the probability of innovation with re-
spect to patents, but we also nd that: (1) their outcome can be replicated
by a licensing scheme in which innovators sell complete patent rights, and (2)
they are dynamically unstable. We nd that none of the above regimes can
reach the rst or second best. Finally, we consider patents of nite duration
and determine the optimal patent length.
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Patents are intended to enhance private investment in R&D through the
monopoly power they grant to the innovator over the commercial exploita-
tion of her invention. Generally, innovations are sequentially linked. For
instance, the invention of the radio would have been impossible without the
previous discovery of electromagnetic waves. This sequential nature of in-
novation introduces the issue of how to divide the revenues of the sequence
of innovations among the dierent innovators. Suppose that two innovations
may be introduced sequentially (the second innovation cannot be introduced
until the rst one has been introduced). If a patent is granted to the rst
innovator, she may obtain a claim over part of the revenues of the second
innovator. The policy maker is confronted with an important trade-o: if the
patent covering the rst innovation is strong, it may imply that the second
innovation becomes unprotable. On the other hand, if the patent is weak,
it may provide low incentives to introduce the rst innovation.
This problem has been studied in depth by the literature on sequential
innovation, pioneered by Scotchmer (1991). Usually, this literature analyzed
the optimal division of prots between two sequential innovators. But what
happens when each innovation builds on several prior inventions? Going back
to the case of radio, it was not only electromagnetic waves that radio was
based upon, but also high-frequency alternator, high-frequency transmission
arc, magnetic amplier, the crystal detector, diode and triode valves, direc-
tional aerial, etc. In the words of Edwin Armstrong (inventor of FM radio)
\it was absolutely impossible to manufacture any kind of workable apparatus
without using practically all of the inventions which were then known".
In this paper, we extend the literature on sequential innovation by ana-
lyzing the case in which patents generate cumulative claims on subsequent
innovations. If the number of claims is large, innovators may face a patent
thicket and may be threatened by the possibility of hold up, namely the pos-
sibility that a socially desirable innovation fails to be performed due to the
2lack of agreement with previous inventors Shapiro (2001).
Patent thickets are pervasive in hi-tech industries, like software, hard-
ware, biotechnology and electronics. For example, in the 1980s IBM ac-
cused Sun Microsystems of infringing some of its 10,000 software patents
(http://www.forbes.com/asap/2002/0624/044.html); development of golden
rice required access to 40 patented products and processes (Gra et al., 2003);
and there are 39 patent families \potentially relevant in developing a malaria
vaccine from MSP-1" (Commision on Intellectual Property Rights, 2002).
When a patent thicket arises the innovator must pay license fees on many
patented previous discoveries, which may lead to low innovation. Heller and
Eisenberg (1998) were the rst to suggest that a reduction in innovation
activity would have stemmed from what Heller (1998) denes the tragedy
of the anticommons. This phenomenon arises when too many agents have
rights of exclusion over a common, scarce resource, and as a consequence
the common resource is under-utilized, in clear duality with the tragedy
of the commons. In our case, the anticommons could arise if too many
patentees have exclusive claims on separate components of the state-of-the-
art technology, placing an obstacle to future research. In this paper we
build a model to analyze whether anticommons in sequential innovation is a
theoretical possibility.
Abstracting from transaction costs, or the possibility that one or more
patentees refuse to license their idea therefore blocking innovation, anticom-
mons are similar to complementary monopoly: many monopolistic input
providers selling their inputs to a nal good producer. The problem of com-
plementary monopoly was rst analyzed by Cournot (1838). He modeled
a competitive producer of brass who has to use copper and zinc as perfect
complement inputs in production. He showed that, when the inputs are sold
by two dierent monopolists, the total cost of producing brass is higher than
when the two inputs are sold by the same monopolist. Sonnenschein (1968)
showed that complementary monopoly is equivalent to duopoly in quantity
3with homogeneous goods, and Bergstrom (1978) generalized this result to a
general number n of inputs and any degree of complementarity among them.
Recently Shapiro (2001) and Lerner and Tirole (2004) applied the instru-
ments of complementary monopoly to the analysis of patent pools. Their
results reinforced the results on complementary monopoly: patent pools (or
equivalently a single monopolist owning all the patented inputs) reduces the
cost of innovation when patents are complements, and it increases it when
they are substitutes. Boldrin and Levine (2005) and Llanes and Trento (2009)
also made use of complementary monopoly to show that, as the number of
complementary patents increases, the probability that a future innovation is
protable goes to zero.
All these papers, while making important contributions, present static
models. In other words, the rst innovation has been already invented, so
patents and patent pools only aect the protability of introducing a second
innovation. This introduces an important asymmetry between previous and
future innovations. We believe that adding a dynamic dimension is an impor-
tant step towards a better understanding of the mechanism of anticommons
in sequential innovation.
Developing a dynamic model is important for several reasons. First, it
will eliminate any bias stemming from the asymmetric treatment of old and
new ideas. Second, patent policy will aect not only current but also future
innovative activity. Third, it will allow us to analyze the problem of assigning
resources to promote innovations with low commercial value (basic research).
Fourth, some of the previous ndings in the literature will be aected by the
introduction of the temporal dimension, and new issues will arise precisely
because of this modication.
We present a dynamic model to study the division of prot when each
innovation builds on several prior inventions. There is a sequence of innova-
tions n = 1;2;:::. Innovation n cannot be introduced until innovation n   1
has been introduced. Each innovation has a commercial value (the prot it
4generates as a nal good), which is random and private information of the
innovator, and a deterministic cost of R&D to be developed.
Our model provides a good description of the innovation process in sev-
eral industries. For example, in the software industry the rst programs were
written from scratch, and therefore built on little prior knowledge. As more
and more programs were developed, they progresively became more depen-
dent on technologies introduced by the rst programs. According to Garnkel
et al. (1991), nowadays software programs contain thousands of mathemati-
cal algorithms and techniques, which may be patented by the innovators who
developed them. Similar examples can be found in other hi-tech industries.
Formally, our model is a multi-stage game in discrete time with uncertain
end. Interestingly, the probability of reaching the next period is determined
endogenously. Our theoretical contribution is to present a simple dynamic
model that can obtain closed form solutions for the sequence of probabilities
of innovation. The equilibrium concept we use is Subgame Perfect Equilib-
rium with Markovian Strategies (Markov Perfect Equilibrium).
We are interested in determining equilibrium dynamics under three sce-
narios: patents, no patents and patent pools. The novel aspect of our model
is that patents generate cumulative claims on the sequence of innovations.
Patents aect the innovator in two ways: on one hand, the innovator has to
pay licensing fees to all previous inventors, but on the other hand, she will
collect licensing revenues from all subsequent innovators, in case they decide
to innovate. Therefore, it is not clear what is the net eect of patents on
innovation as the sequence of innovations progresses.
We nd that with patents, innovation becomes harder and harder with
more complex innovations. The probability of innovation goes to 0 as n ! 1.
The probability of innovation is higher than in the static case, but not enough
to stop the tragedy of the anticommons from happening.
In the no patents case, on the other hand, the probability of innovation
is constant and depends on the degree of appropriability of the commercial
5value of the innovation in the nal goods sector. The no patents case will
provide higher innovation than the patents case unless the innovator can
appropriate a very small fraction of the value of the innovation.
When ideas are protected by patents, the formation of a patent pool
increases the probability of innovation for all innovations. Interestingly, the
probability of innovation with a pool is constant and higher than what it
would be in the static case. This result strengthens the ndings of Shapiro
(2001), Lerner and Tirole (2004), and Llanes and Trento (2009) for static
models. The comparison between the pool and the no patents case depends
once again on the degree of appropriability of the value of the innovation in
the latter case.
We present two additional ndings which are new to the literature of
patent pools. First, the patent pool outcome can be replicated by a scheme
in which each innovator buys all patent rights from the preceding innovator,
instead of paying only for the permission to use the idea (innovator 1 sells
all the rights over innovation 1 to innovator 2, who sells all the rights over
innovations 1 and 2 to innovator 3 and so on). This means that the complete
sale of patent rights will generate higher innovation than licensing. However,
this scheme may be dicult to implement when the nature of innovations is
dicult to describe ex-ante, in which case patent pools would be easier to
enforce. Second, we nd that pools are dynamically unstable: the temptation
to remain outside the pool increases as the sequence of innovations advances.
This means that early innovators have more incentives to enter the pool than
later innovators.
We nd the optimal innovation policy that maximizes the expected wel-
fare of the sequence of innovations. We nd that innovation is suboptimal
in the three policy regimes. In the no patents regime, there is a dynamic
externality: innovators do not take into account the impact of their decision
on the technological possibilities of future innovators. In the two other pol-
icy regimes, the ineciency stems from asymmetric information and market
6power: patent holders do not know the exact value of the innovation, but
they know its probability distribution. This generates a downward sloping
expected demand for the use of their ideas, and market power implies a price
for old ideas above marginal cost.
It is interesting to analyze the second best innovation policy, implemented
through transfers between innovators when the patent oce does not know
the value of the innovations. In this case, we nd that patents are larger
than these transfers, and therefore the patent regime cannot even attain the
second best. Finally, we extend the basic model to analyze what happens
when the sequence of innovations does not stop after an innovation fails, and
to analyze the optimal patent policy when patents have nite length.
Our paper is related to Hopenhayn et al. (2006), which also presents a
model of cumulative innovation with asymmetric information. However, the
focus of that paper is dierent. In their paper innovations are substitutes:
the introduction of a new product automatically implies the disappearance
of old versions in the market. Patents block the introduction of subsequent
innovations for the duration of the patent. The question they study is how to
allocate monopoly power in the nal goods market to successive innovations.
A trade-o arises because the promise of property rights to the rst innovator
limits what can be oered to the second innovator. In our paper, innovations
are complementary: all prior inventions are necessary to introduce a new idea.
We study what is the eect of intellectual property rights on the pricing of old
ideas. The problem is that granting too many rights on sequential innovations
implies an increase in licensing fees, potentially hindering innovation as a
consequence. Therefore, the two papers oer complementary analysis of the
process of sequential innovation when the value of innovations is private
information.
72. Innovation with patents
There is a sequence of innovations n = 1;2;:::. Innovation n cannot be
introduced until innovation n   1 has been introduced. Formally, the model
is a multi-stage game with uncertain end. At each stage, an innovator may
introduce an innovation. If the innovation is performed, the game continues
and further innovations may be introduced. If the innovation fails to be
performed, the game ends and no other innovation can be introduced (we
will relax this assumption in Section 10). We will see that the probability
that the game continues is determined endogenously.
The innovation process is deterministic. At stage n, the innovator may
introduce the new idea by incurring in an R&D cost of ". The new idea is
based on n 1 previous ideas. These previous ideas are protected by patents,
which means that the innovator has to pay licensing fees to the n 1 previous
innovators (patent holders), in case she wants to introduce the innovation.
The cost of innovation is the sum of the cost of R&D and the licensing fees
paid to patent holders.
The innovation process reects the fact that usually earlier innovations
do not have a solid background to build upon, while as the market comes to
maturity further innovations are more and more indebted to previous ones.
Each idea has a commercial value vn, which represents the revenues ob-
tained by selling the new product in the nal goods market. In order to
concentrate on the eects of patents on innovation activity, we will assume
that the innovator is a perfect price discriminator in the nal goods market,
which means that the commercial value of the innovation is equal to the
social surplus generated by the new product.
The value of the innovation is private information of the innovator. Paten-
tees only know that vn is drawn from a uniform distribution between 0 and
1, with cumulative distribution function F(vn) = vn.
The new idea will be protected by a patent of innite length, which means
that the innovator can request licensing fees from all subsequent innovators
8(we will relax this assumption in Section 11). The total revenues of the inno-
vation equal the commercial value of the innovation plus the future licensing
revenues.
The timing of the game within each stage is the following: (i) the n   1
patent holders set licensing fees pi
n, (ii) Nature extracts a value for vn from
distribution F(vn), (iii) the innovator decides whether to innovate (In = 1)
or not (In = 0).
At each stage, patent holders only care about maximizing the expected
future licensing revenues. Let Ji
n denote the expected future licensing rev-
enues of innovator i at stage n, given that stage n has been reached. Then,
J
i
n = Prn p
i
n + Prn Prn+1 p
i










where Prn is the probability that the nth innovation is introduced, given that
all prior innovations have been introduced. Notice that the probabilities Prn
work as intertemporal discount factors, which arise endogenoulsy from the
specication of the model.
Ji
n can also be expressed in a recursive way:
J
i





This means that with probability Prn the innovation is performed, and the
patent holder gets the licensing fee from the innovator plus the continuation
value of her expected licensing revenues.
The innovator's payo is In(vn + Jn




the sum of licensing fees paid to previous innovators.
We will focus on Markov strategies. A strategy for player i species
an action conditioned on the state, where actions are prices and the state
is simply the number of previous innovations introduced. The equilibrium
9concept is Markov Perfect Equilibrium.
Perfectness implies that future prices will be determined in following sub-
games, as the result of a Nash equilibrium. Thus, players understand that no
action taken today can inuence future prices and probabilities. Current ac-
tions only aect the probability that the following stage is reached, through
the eect of current prices on the probability of innovation. We have just
proved the following lemma:
Lemma 1. Ji
m for m > n does not depend on any action taken at stage n.
The game is solved recursively. The solution to the innovator's problem is
straightforward. Given vn and cn, the innovator forecasts Jn
n+1, and decides




1 if vn + Jn
n+1  cn + ";
0 otherwise,
(3)
which implies that the probability of innovation is Prn = 1 + Jn
n+1   cn   ".
At stage n, patent holders want to maximize their expected licensing
revenues from stage n onwards. They know their decisions do not aect Ji
n+1
(they can only aect the probability that stage n+1 is reached), and decide
a licensing fee pi
n, taking the decision of the other patent holders as given.











which leads to a price equal to pi
n = (1   ")=n.
Imposing symmetry, pi
n = pn and Ji
n = Jn for all i. Replacing prices and








n , which is a decreasing sequence, converging to 0 as n ! 1.








10which is also a decreasing sequence converging to 0 as n ! 1. This means
that innovation gets harder and harder with more complex innovations (those
that are based on more previous innovations).
The probability of innovation decreases with complexity because patent
holders do not take into account cross-price eects: patent holder i set the
price of her patent by equating the marginal revenue and the marginal cost
of increasing her license fee. The marginal revenue is simply the additional
revenue in case the new innovation is performed. The marginal cost is the re-
duction in expected demand, and depends on the fact that - since all patents
are essential for the new innovation - increasing the price of patent i de-
creases the probability of innovation. As a matter of fact, increasing the
price of patent i reduces the expected demand for all other inputs, but this
eect does not enter the marginal cost for patent holder i. This generates
the anticommons eect that closely resembles the tragedy of the commons:
patent holders ignore this cross-price eects and set a price that is higher
than the price they would set if they coordinated (see section 4).
In practice the anticommons can be interpreted as a combination of co-
ordination failure and market power. Each patent produces a claim over
part of the revenues generated by subsequent innovations. Since each patent
is essential, and patent holders do not take into account cross-price eects,
they set a license fee that is too high. As the number of claims increases, the
coordination problem gets worse, until eventually the new innovator is left
with negative expected prots with probability one.
3. Innovation without patents
Suppose that a policy reform completely removes patents. This change
has two eects on innovation. First, the revenues of the innovator in the
nal goods sector will decrease as a result of imitation. Specically, assume
that the innovator can only appropriate a fraction  2 [0;1] of the consumer
surplus generated by the innovation. Second, innovators will not pay licensing
11fees to previous innovators, nor will they charge for the use of their ideas in
subsequent innovations. Therefore, cn = 0 and Jn = 0 in the previous model.
At each stage: (i) nature extracts a value of the innovation vn, and (ii)
the innovator decides to innovate or not. The innovator will innovate if
vn  " and will not innovate otherwise. Thus, the probability of innovation
is constant and equal to 1   "= if  > ". If   ", then the probability of
innovation is zero.
4. Patent pools
In this section we analyze what happens when licensing fees are set coop-
eratively by a collective institution like a patent pool. At each stage, the pool
maximizes the future expected revenues of current patent holders. The pool
will set a symmetric price for all current patent holders. Once an innovation
is performed, the innovator becomes a member of the pool in all subsequent
stages. In the rst stage there is no pool because no innovation has been
introduced (the pool plays from stage 2 onwards).




Jn = Prn (pn + Jn+1): (6)
The dierence with respect to the non-cooperative case is that the pool rec-
ognizes cross-price eects, and therefore is encouraged to set lower prices
than in the no-pool case.
A higher Jn+1 fosters innovation in two ways. First, it increases the future
revenues of the innovator. Second, it encourages the pool to set a lower
price, because it increases the loss of current patent holders if the sequence
of innovations is stopped.
The equilibrium price is pn = 1 "
2(n 1)   n 2
2(n 1)Jn+1, which is equal to the
price a pool would set in a static model (see section 8.1) minus an additional
term arising from the pool's concern of keeping future revenues.
12The probability of innovation becomes Prn = 1 "
2 + n
2Jn+1. Introducing













This is a rst order non-linear dierence equation. Jn is decreasing in n and
converges to 0 as n ! 1.










which is a constant sequence such that Prn = 1 
p
" for n  2. To determine
Pr1 we need J2, which is equal to (1 
p




Figure 1 shows the evolution of the probability of innovation in the three
cases studied above: innitely lived patents, no patents and patent pool.
The cost of R&D is " = 0:2 and we consider  = 1 (full appropriation) and
 = 0:3 (the innovator appropriates 30% of the social surplus generated by
the new product) for the no patents case.
Comparing the patent and no-patent cases, we can see that patents in-
crease the probability of the rst innovations but decrease the probability of
further innovations. The number of innovations for which patents increase
the probability depends on . For example, when  = 1, patents only in-
crease the probability of the rst innovation. Nevertheless, even when  = 0:3
the probability increases only for the rst two innovations. For patents to
increase the probability of several innovations, it is necessary that  is very
small and close to " (i.e. when there is very little appropriability without
patents).
When ideas are protected by patents, the formation of a patent pool in-
13creases the probability of innovation. Figure 1 shows that the probability of
innovation with patent pools is always larger than the patents case. More-
over, with a pool the probability of innovation does not go to zero as n ! 1.
The comparison with the no patents case depends on " and . If  is low,
a patent pool increases the probability of all innovations. When  is high,
the pool increases the probability of the rst innovation, and decreases the
probability of all posterior innovations.
Figure 1: Comparison of equilibria.
6. Complete sale of patent rights
The tragedy of the anticommons stems from fragmented ownership of
complementary patents. In this case, the probability of innovation decreases
as more innovations are introduced, converging to 0 as n ! 1. The for-
mation of a patent pool would alleviate this problem by concentrating all
pricing decisions on one entity. In this section, we discuss a possible alterna-
tive solution, which is to enforce the sale of complete patent rights, instead
of allowing the sale of individual access rights through licensing fees. These
14patent rights, in turn, can be resold to other innovators. In this case, innova-
tor 1 would sell the complete patent rights over innovation 1 to innovator 2
for a price }1. Innovator 2 then would sell the patent rights on innovations 1
and 2 to innovator 3 for a price }2, and so on. We will show that this mech-
anism eliminates the coordination failure at the basis of the anticommons,
and that it replicates the innovation outcome under a patent pool.
The cost of innovation n becomes " + }n 1, its expected revenues vn +
Prn+1}n, and the probability that innovation n is performed Prn = 1   "  






n = Prn }n 1 (9)
where Js
n represent expected revenues of selling the n   1 patent rights to
innovator n.








n+1 exactly as in the patent pool case. As before, the sequence is Pr1 =
minf1;2(1  
p
")g, and Prn = 1  
p
" for n  2.
An alternative policy arrangement leading to the same result would be
the following: restoring the possibility of licensing access rights, but at the
same time allowing subsequent competition between the licensee and the
original licensor. In this case, if innovator n licenses the use of innovation n
to innovator n + 1, then innovator n + 2 can license the use of innovation n
from innovators n and n+1. Under this policy arrangement, innovator n will
only get positive revenues from the licensing of her innovation to innovator
n + 1, because at stage n + 1 she is a monopolist. After that, she will face
competition from other innovators, and Bertrand competition will imply a
licensing fee equal to zero.
These schemes may be dicult to implement when the nature of inno-
vations is dicult to describe ex-ante. For example, when selling the rights
over innovation n to innovator n + 1, it is dicult to describe what innova-
15tion n+2 may be. In this case, complete contracts may be dicult to write,
making patent pools easier to enforce.
7. Endogenous patent pool formation
In section 4 we have assumed that all innovators, after innovating, au-
tomatically join the patent pool. Let us now endogeneize this choice, by
analyzing the incentives for innovator n to join the pool. In particular let us
compare the expected revenues from joining the pool (Jn from section 4) with
the expected revenues from setting the price of her patent non-cooperatively
(Jo
n).
We start with the non-cooperative choice. For expositional clarity let
us refer to the patent pool members as insiders and to the non-cooperative


















n denoting the price of the outsider's patent.











From rst order conditions we know that Jo
n = (n   2)Ji
n, meaning that
if there is one outsider it is convenient to be her. Now let us compare the
expected revenues from not joining the pool (Jo
n) to the expected revenues of
joining the pool given that everybody else is in the pool (Jn from section 4).
In equilibrium, deviating from the pool produces and expected revenue of
Jo
n = (3  
p
1 + 8")=4, which is constant and only depend on the R&D cost
". If, on the other hand, innovator n decides to join the pool together with
the n 1 previous innovators, her expected revenue is Jn = (1  ")2=(n 1)
which is decreasing in n. This is because the patent pool maximizes the
16joint prots, thus keeping total cost of innovating constant. This constant
amount must be divided among an increasing number of insiders, therefore
the expected revenue of an insider is decreasing in n. Figure 2 shows the
gains from deviating from the pool, that is the dierence between Jo
n and Jn,
as a function of n. For n  4 it is convenient for the innovator to set her
price non-cooperatively.
Figure 2: Gains from not joining the patent pool.
Patent pools can improve innovation activity, but are dynamically unsta-
ble. Early innovators have more incentives to enter the pool than subsequent
innovators. This might explain why governments in some cases have to en-
force the creation of patent pools, as the US government did in the radio and
aircraft cases for example.
8. Socially optimal innovation
The relevant measure of welfare is the expected social value generated by
the sequence of innovations. The social value of an innovation is equal to the
increase in consumer surplus minus the cost of the resources spent in R&D.
Therefore, at stage n, the social value generated is vn   " if an innovation is































(1   wm); (12)
where wn is the smallest vn such that the innovation is performed. In the cases
studied above, wn = "= when there are no patents and wn = cn + "   Jn+1
with patents or patent pools.
Suppose now that the decision of whether to innovate or not is taken by
a centralized agency or social planner. The social planner has to determine
fwng1
n=1, namely what is the minimum value of vn she would require to
perform the innovation at stage n. The planner may decide to perform an
innovation even when the realization of vn is less than ", if the expected gain
from future innovations exceeds the current loss in terms of welfare.
Proposition 1 (Socially optimal innovation). In order to maximize expected







0 if "  E(vn) = 1=2;
p
2"   1 if " > E(vn) = 1=2:
(13)
Proof. Because previous decisions are irrelevant once a stage is reached, the
social planner's problem at stage n is exactly the same as the problem at


















The rst order condition is  (1+w2 2")=(2w2)  0, with equality if w  0.
The value that equates the rst order condition, w =
p
2"   1, makes sense
only when "  1=2. On the other hand, when w ! 0, the rst order condition
converges to sign(2"   1)1, which means that w = 0 only if " < 1=2.
Figure 3: Socially optimal innovation.
Proposition 1 implies that innovation will be suboptimal in the three cases
studied above, unless " = 0. There are three reasons why this is so: dynamic
externalities, market power and asymmetric information.
The dynamic externality is best described by analyzing the no patents
case. Without patents, the innovator will perform the innovation when
vn  "=. Given that w
n  ", the innovator may decide not to perform
an innovation when it is socially optimal to do so, even if  = 1. There is a
dynamic externality: the innovator ignores the eect of her decision on the
technological possibilities of future innovators. This eect is well known in
the literature of sequential innovation (Scotchmer, 1991; Hopenhayn et al.,
2006), and is similar to the one found in the literature of moral hazard in
19teams (see for example Holmstrom, 1982), where each agent internalizes only
his reward from the eort exerted.
With respect to the patents and patent pool cases, the ineciency arises
from a dierent source: market power and asymmetric information. Because
patentees care about the stream of future licensing revenues, they internalize
the eect of today's decision on future innovation. However, asymmetric in-
formation implies a downward sloping expected demand for old innovations,
and market power implies inecient pricing of patents, which leads to subop-
timal innovation. As the number of holders of rights on innovation increases,
the ineciency due to market power increases.
Figure 4: Comparison of expected welfare.
8.1. Static versus dynamic incentives
Previous models of complementary monopoly, sequential innovation and
patent pools were static (Shapiro, 2001; Lerner and Tirole, 2004; Boldrin and
Levine, 2005; Llanes and Trento, 2009). It is interesting to ask what changes
when we add the dynamic dimension.
To see what happens in the static case, assume only one innovation is
being considered. The innovation uses n   1 old ideas, which have already
20been invented. If the innovation is performed, the innovator obtains a value v
from a uniform distribution between 0 and 1, and incurs in a cost " of R&D.
The probability of innovation is Pr = 1 " cn, with patents or patent pool
and Pr = 1   "= without patents.
With patents, the patent holder's problem is to maximize Prpi, the equi-
librium price is 1 "
n and the probability of innovation is 1 "
n . We have shown
that in the dynamic model, the probability is 1 "
n +Jn+1, with Jn+1 > 0. This
extra term arises because the innovator gets licensing revenues from future
innovators. Dynamic incentives imply a higher probability of innovation, but
the increase is not enough to prevent the probability from converging to 0 as
n ! 1.
A patent pool would consider cross-price eects, which would lead to a
price of 1 "
2(n 1) and a probability of innovation of 1 "
2 . The probability of the
corresponding dynamic model is 1 "
2 + (n   1)Jn, with Jn+1 > 0. In this
case, the extra term arises not only due to the future licensing revenues of
the innovator, but also because the pool is concerned with keeping the future
licensing revenues of current patent holders.
With respect to the no patents case, the prot-maximizing decision is
the same as in the dynamic case. This means that innovators will perform
the innovation if vn  ", which leads to a probability of Pr = 1   "=.
However, in the dynamic case innovation is suboptimal even when  = 1,
which contrast with the static case, where innovation is socially optimal
because there is no intertemporal link between innovations and therefore
there is no externality.
9. Dynamic externalities and optimal transfers
In the previous section we have shown that sequential innovation is sub-
optimal because of the presence of dynamic externalities and asymmetric
information. Without patents, current innovators do not take into account
the eect of their decisions on the innovation possibilities of future inno-
21vators. The solution to this problem would require intertemporal transfers
between innovators. Patents provide a way to transfer resources from fu-
ture innovators to current innovators, but we have shown that with patents,
market power leads to high licensing fees for old innovations, and therefore
to low innovation. In this section we ask how close can the government get
to the social optimum when it does not have information on the value of
innovations (second best analysis).
To do this, we will use a simplied 2-period version of the general model.
In the rst period, innovator 1 has the option of introducing an innovation
with value v1 and cost ". If innovator 1 decides to perform the innovation,
in the second period, innovator 2 can introduce an innovation with value v2
and cost ". Innovator 1 does not know v2.
To determine the social optimum, we have to assume the social planner
knows v1 at stage 1, and v2 at stage 2. It is likely to think that the government
would have reduced information on vn, but assuming the social planner does
not know vn would imply that innovation decisions without patents give
higher welfare than the social optimum, which does not make sense. Later
we will analyze government policy, and we will assume that the government
does not know vn.
9.1. First best
Let us begin by nding the optimal innovation policy in this 2-stage
model. At stage 2 the value and cost of the rst innovation are sunk. There-
fore, the second innovation should be performed if v2  ", and should not be
performed otherwise. Consider now the rst innovation. The social planner
will introduce this innovation if
v1 + Pr(v2  ")E(v2   "=v2  ")  "; (15)










Without patents, the probability of introducing the second innovation is
Pr2 = 1   ", which is optimal. However, the probability of introducing the
rst innovation is also Pr1 = 1 ", which is less than optimal. The reason is
the same as in Section 8: the rst innovator does not take into account the
eect of her decision on the innovation possibilities of the second innovator.
With patents, innovator 1 sets a licensing fee p1 to try to extract part
of the surplus of innovator 2 (in this 2-period model, the patent and patent
pool cases are the same). The probability of innovation of innovator 2 is
Pr2 = 1   "   p1. Innovator 1 maximizes:
max
p1
v1   " + (1   "   p1)p1; (16)
which leads to a price p1 = (1   ")=2. The probabilities of innovation are
Pr1 = minf1;
(1 ")(5 ")
4 g and Pr2 = (1 ")=2, so Pr1  Pr
1 and Pr2 < Pr
2.
This is due to the combined eects of asymmetric information and market
power.
Therefore, the 2-period model presents a simplied version of the general
model but still allows to capture the externality and asymmetric information
problems.
9.2. Second best: optimal transfers
One way to correct the dynamic externality would be to allow for transfers
from future innovators to current innovators. We have seen that patents fail
to convey appropriate incentives because of asymmetric information. In this
subsection we analyze what is the optimal transfer a government should set
to maximize expected welfare when it does not have information on the value
of innovations, and we compare it with that of the patents case.
Assume that the government does not know v1 nor v2. In this case, the
government cannot make the transfer depend on the realization of v2, and it
will be impossible to reach the optimum. The best the government can do is
23to set a transfer equal to t if innovator 2 innovates, and 0 otherwise.
In this case, innovator 1 will innovate if v1 + Pr2 t  ", and innovator










(1   ")(2   "   t)(1   " + t(1   t   ")):




3   2"  
p
6   6" + "2
3
; (18)
where t < p1. Therefore, even if the government does not know v2, it will
set a lower transfer than the licensing fee of innovator 1 with patents. This
is due to the combined eects of asymmetric information and market power
with patents.
10. Ongoing innovation
In this section we analyze what happens if the sequence of innovations
does not stop after one innovation fails to be performed. There is a sequence
of innovations n = 1;2;:::, just as before, but now there can be many trials
until an innovation is successful.
Innovator n;j is the jth innovator trying to introduce innovation n (j  1
previous innovators tried to introduce innovation n without success). The
innovator has to pay licensing fees to n   1 patentees (the n   1 previous
successful innovators), and obtains a draw vnj from the same distribution
as before. If the revenues from the innovation are higher than the cost,
innovator n;j will introduce the innovation, and in the next stage, innovator
n + 1;1 will try to introduce innovation n + 1. If revenues are lower than
cost, innovator n;j fails to introduce innovation n, which will then be tried
24by innovator n;j+1 in the following stage. This innovator will face the same
n   1 patent holders and will have a new draw of the value of innovation
vn;j+1.
For this model, we need to be more specic about the time dimension.
Specically, assume that stages correspond to time periods. At each period
only one trial for one innovation is performed. The discount factor of inno-
vator and patent holders is . At stage n + j the game is summarized by a
state fn;jg.
Let Ji
nj be the expected future licensing revenues of patentee i at trial j
of innovation n, given that stage n + j has been reached under state fn;jg.
Expressed in a recursive way:
J
i




n+1;1) + (1   Prnj)J
i
n;j+1; (19)
where Prnj is the probability that innovation n is introduced in trial j. With
probability Prnj, the patent holder gets the price pi
nj plus the continua-
tion value of J of the rst trial of the next innovation, Ji
n+1;1, appropriately
discounted by . With probability 1 Prnj, the innovation will not be intro-
duced and the patent holder gets the continuation value of J corresponding
to the next trial of the current innovation.
The prot of the innovator is Inj (vnj + Jn+1;1   cnj   ").
Just as before, subgame perfection implies that the patent holders take
Ji
n+1;1 and Ji
n;j+1 as given when deciding pi
nj. The prot maximizing price is
pi
nj = (1 "+Ji
n;j+1)=n. In a symmetric equilibrium, pi
nj = pn and Ji
nj = Jn
for all i;j.
Replacing in the probability of innovation, we get Prn = 1 "
n + Jn+1  
n 1



























which is a decreasing sequence converging to 0 as n ! 1.

















which is also a decreasing sequence converging to 0 as n ! 1. Therefore,
the main conclusions of the basic model still hold under when innovation
does not stop when a single innovation fails.
11. Finite patents
In this section we analyze what happens if patents have nite length. Each
stage corresponds to one period and only one innovation is attempted at each
period. If the innovator decides to introduce the innovation, she obtains a
patent for L periods. This means that the innovator has to pay patents for
L previous innovations, but also charges licenses to L future innovators.
The main diculty of the present analysis is that now the identity of the
patent holders matters. The price and future expected licensing revenues
will be dierent for dierent patent holders, depending on how long will it
take for her patent to expire.
The innovator will introduce the innovation if the revenues from innova-














n + "; (23)
26which means that the probability of innovation is













n   ": (24)
The L current patent holders dier in their objective functions. Let Ji
n be
the future expected revenues of patent holder i at stage n, given that stage








The patent holder charging a license for the last time is patent holder
n L, so J
n L
n+1 = 0. The patent of n L+1, on the other hand, will last for
one more period, so J
n L+1
n+1 = Prn+1 p
n L+1
n+1 . In this way, we can construct
the future expected revenues of the L patent holders.











The rst order condition is  pi
n   Ji





n for all i. This also implies that pn L
n = Prn.
We are interested in stationary equilibria, which means that Prn = Pr
for all n. This, together with the rst order condition, implies that pi
n =
Pr(1 Pr) for i  n L. Replacing in the probability of innovation, we get:















Pr(1   Pr)Prm + PrPrL   (L   1)Pr(1   Pr)   Pr   ": (27)
27Solving for Pr, we get:
Pr =
L + 1  
p
(L   1)2 + 4L"
2L
(28)
which is the stationary equilibrium probability of innovation.
Figure 5 shows the probability of innovation as a function of the patent
length for " = 0:2. We can see that the probability of innovation decreases
with L, which means that patents hurt more than benet the innovator. This
is because the innovator has to pay licenses that are certain to the patent
holders, but the future licensing revenues are uncertain, as they depend on
future innovations being performed.
It is also interesting to see that Pr ! 0 when L ! 1 and Pr ! 1   "
when L ! 0, which correspond to the previously analyzed patents and no
patents cases (with  = 1).
Figure 5: Probability of innovation and patent length.
11.1. Revenues depend on patent length
We have assumed that the revenues from selling the new product in the
nal goods market are independent of patent length. In this subsection we
analyze what happens when we relax this assumption. Assume the revenues
of the innovator are (L)vn, with 0(L)  0;00(L)  0;limL!0 (L) = 
28and limL!1 (L) = 1. Here,  is the fraction of social surplus the innovator
would appropriate without any patent protection, due to trade secrets or rst
mover advantages.















Applying a similar procedure as that of the previous case, we obtain the
probability of innovation in the stationary equilibrium:
Pr =
L + 1  
p
(L   1)2 + 4L"=(L)
2L
: (30)
The eect of patent length on the probability of innovation depends on
the functional form of (L). Let (L) = 1  
1 
(L+1), where  measures the
speed at which revenues grow when L increases. Figure 6a shows that when
 is more concave ( = 1), the probability of innovation rst increases and
then decreases with patent length. The optimal length is positive and nite
(in this case L = 1). Figure 6b shows that for a lower degree of concavity of
(L) it is optimal to completely remove patents. Therefore, the results do
not change signicantly when the revenues in the nal goods sector depend
on patent length.
12. Conclusion
In this paper we build a dynamic model where accumulation of patents
generates an increasing number of claims on cumulative innovation. The
model is intended to reproduce the central feature of innovation activity
in hi-tech industries: new products are more complex than old products,
because they build on a larger stock of previously accumulated knowledge.
We study the policy that maximizes expected social welfare and com-
pare it with the outcome of three patent policy regimes: patents, patent
29(a)  = 0:2;" = 0:1; = 1. (b)  = 0:2;" = 0:1; = 0:1.
Figure 6: Probability of innovation as a function of patent length.
pools and no patents. We nd that, even abstracting from the monopolistic
ineciencies of patents, none of these policies attains the optimum.
With patents, the innovator has to pay an increasing number of license
fees to previous innovator. Asymmetric information on the value of the inno-
vation and uncoordinated market power of licensor create an anticommons
eect that reduces the incentives to innovate as innovation becomes more
complex. The anticommons eect is weaker than in the static case, but it
is still strong enough to drive the probability of innovation to zero as the
number of licenses grows large. Enforcing a patent pool solves the lack of
coordination but not the asymmetric information problem. As a result the
outcome of patent pools is more desirable but still it does not achieve the
rst best. Eliminating patent protection solves the two problems but intro-
duce a non-internalized externality: previous innovations set the foundations
for future innovations. Therefore it might be the case that the social cost of
one innovation is higher than its instantaneous social value (the social value
the innovation creates per se), and yet the innovation is socially desirable
because it allows the development of further innovations. This is the typical
problem faced by basic research.
Then we study alternative solutions to the anticommons: (i) the com-
plete sale of patent rights of each innovator to the next one, and (ii) the
30possibility that the licensee compete with the original licensor. Both alter-
natives exactly replicate the sequence of innovations under the patent pool
regime. Another interesting result of the paper is that patent pools are dy-
namically unstable, as the incentives to remain outside the pool increase as
the sequence of innovations progresses.
We also nd that the outcome of these three policy arrangements does
not even attain the second best. The second best is achievable by means
of government transfers, assuming that the government does not know the
value of the innovation.
This paper shows that patent protection may be the wrong way to provide
incentives to innovation in complex industries like electronics, software and
hardware. Enforcing patent pools or eliminating patent protection would
improve welfare, but still would not reach the social optimum. We hope
this paper will contribute to future research on the design of an optimal
innovation policy.
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